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Polls and the Pandemic: Estimating the Electoral Effects of a SARS-CoV-2 
Outbreak 
 
Abstract: The novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) and the associated Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
pandemic has had far-reaching health, economic, social, and political impacts. The latter is the focus of this 
research note, which proposes using a difference-in-differences (DD) approach to estimate the electoral 
impact of reported SARS-CoV-2 infection rates. The approach is illustrated using data from the 2020 
Croatian parliamentary election. The outcomes of interest are the vote shares for the dominant Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) party, as well as the turnout. The analysis concludes that there is no evidence that 
reported county-level infection rates affected HDZ support or turnout. However, results using this approach 
may be affected to the statistical power of the analysis, issues related to causal identification, and reliability 
of infection rate measures. Nonetheless, the DD approach can potentially be applied in contexts around the 
world to estimate the electoral impact of reported SARS-CoV-2 infection rates. 
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Introduction 
The novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) and associated acute respiratory Coronavirus Disease 
2019 (COVID-19) first came to light in December 2019, when a cluster of cases of pneumonia 
was identified in Wuhan, the capital of the Chinese province of Hubei. Chinese scientists 
isolated and identified the novel coronavirus on 7 January 2020 (Wang et al., 2020). Over the 
following months, SARS-CoV-2 spread first within China, and then around the world. On 11 
March 2020, with 118,000 cases in 114 countries, and 4,291 deaths, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared a (global) pandemic (WHO, 2020). 
Beyond the health effects on individuals, understanding the political impact of the 
pandemic is vital. The initial SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks and associated restrictions occurred 
across Europe in spring 2020, but as the number of new infections began to decrease, 
governments across the continent began to relax related measures. With this loosening of 
restrictions came an attempted return to ‘normal’ competitive electoral politics, with 
nationwide elections occurring in Poland, Serbia, Croatia, and Iceland during June and July 
2020. Since such elections were held in the months following the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, the 
polls potentially provide insights into the political impact of the pandemic within these 
countries. 
The primary objectives of the analysis below are to use a causal inference approach that 
can be applied in many other contexts to estimate the electoral impact of the SARS-CoV-2 
outbreak within a country, and to also reflect on the challenges of employing such an approach. 
The case of Croatia is selected as a typical European electoral democracy.  
The next section will briefly summarise the Croatian political system and the SARS-
CoV-2 outbreak in the country. The literature linking elections and natural disasters will then 
be briefly outlined. The subsequent sections will explain the sources of data and analytical 
strategy used. In particular, the analysis will employ a difference-in-differences (DD) approach, 
explained in the latter section. The results of the analysis of Croatian elections will then be 
presented. The note concludes with a discussion of the results, as well as highlighting a number 
of challenges in estimating the electoral effects of the novel coronavirus outbreak. 
 
The Case of Croatia 
 
The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) has dominated Croatian politics since the first multi-
party Yugoslav elections in 1990, just before the brutal war that led to Croatian independence 
in 1995. HDZ is the party of the establishment, and its vote share is hence the focus of the 
analysis below. 
The Croatian electoral system for parliamentary elections is typical amongst 
proportional systems. Croatia consists of 12 electoral districts: 10 territorial (14 seats each); 
one for minorities (8 seats); and one for Diaspora (3 seats). In each district, the seats are 
allocated using the d’Hondt method. The 21 Croatian counties (županije), including the City 
of Zagreb, are the main sub-national level of governance, each with a legislature and executive. 
Turning to the novel coronavirus outbreak, the first infection was confirmed in Croatia 
on 25 February 2020, with the patient hospitalised in Zagreb (Ilic, 2020). The government, led 
by Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic (HDZ), brought in strict lockdown measures in mid-
March (Pajtak & Delija, 2020). In the period following lockdown, the number of daily new 
infections gradually decreased, reaching zero for a number of days. This allowed the 
government to gradually lift the restrictions between 27 April and 11 May 2020 (OECD, 2020). 
Some commentators noted that the apparent success of containing SARS-CoV-2 in 
Croatia and other parts of Central and Eastern Europe were under-reported in English-language 
media (Culik & Solic, 2020). 
The next Croatian general election was planned for autumn 2020, but the HDZ pushed 
for early elections in July, perhaps to capitalise on the effective handling of the initial outbreak 
(Vladisavljevic, 2020). However, some of the measures were partially reinstated as the number 
of infections started to rise again. The possibly opportunistic move by HDZ looked to backfire, 
with HDZ and the main challengers, the Restart coalition led by the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP), involved in a tight race. However, HDZ won 66 of the 151 seats and formed a coalition 
government on 23 July 2020. 
Before investigating whether the county-level incidence of SARS-CoV-2 affected 
electoral results, the next section will review the literature on electoral behaviour and natural 
disasters.  
  
Retrospective Voting and Natural Disasters 
 
Within political science literature, the idea that elections act as a ‘referendum’ (Fiorina, 1981) 
on the recent performance of incumbent governments has been demonstrated widely (Healy & 
Malhotra, 2013; Lewis-Beck & Stegmeier, 2013). This retrospective voting is conceptualised 
primarily economically. That is, incumbent governments are either electorally rewarded or 
punished related depending on levels of recent economic prosperity (Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 
2000). However, the focus in the analysis below is on non-economic retrospective voting 
behaviour in the midst of a natural disaster. 
O’Keefe et al. (1976) problematised the ‘naturalness’ of natural disasters, concluding 
that the lack of precautionary planning to protect certain vulnerable sections of the population 
led to disasters. This resonates with the experience during the novel coronavirus pandemic, 
which has impacted certain vulnerable communities – such as the elderly, ethnic minorities, 
and precarious migrant labour – more than others. 
In general, elections amidst disaster negatively impact incumbents’ fortunes. For 
example, Achen and Bartels (2002) show that the shark attacks off the New Jersey coast before 
the 1916 electorally hurt Woodrow Wilson in that year’s US Presidential election. Similarly, 
incumbents have been punished electorally after disasters in other contexts (Arcenaux & Stein, 
2006; Gasper & Reeves, 2011). However, Gasper & Reeves (2011) found that although 
incumbents are punished for natural disasters, more attentive responses from incumbents can 
actually lead to electoral benefits. In a large-N study across 156 countries during the period 
1975-2010, Chang and Berdiev (2015) found that the occurrence and number of most natural 
disasters, as well as disaster-related losses, are associated with governmental turnover. 
Crucially for this analysis, there were no significant partial associations related to epidemics, 
though the intensity and scope of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is unprecedented and not covered 
by their analysis. 
Natural disasters could also affect electoral turnout. Sinclair et al. (2011) found mixed 
results in their study of the 2006 New Orleans mayoral election after Hurricane Katrina. 
Though increased difficulties associated with voting led to a decrease in turnout, places where 
flooding was more severe actually had higher turnout, which the authors attributed to increased 
voter mobilisation and motivation to participate. Bodet et al. (2016) argue that the mechanism 
for decreased turnout is more convincing, with increased costs of voting trumping ‘civic duty’. 
The outcomes of interest in the present analysis are thus vote share for the predominant 
political party and voter turnout. 
It is important to note, however, that despite the evidence of post-disaster electoral 
effects, more recent scholarship have found negligible effects (Albrecht, 2017; Bodet et al., 
2016; Bovan et al., 2018; Fowler & Hall, 2016). 




Parliamentary election data for 20151, 20162, and 20203 aggregated by county were obtained 
from the Croatian State Electoral Commission. The following information was extracted: 
county, registered voters, votes cast from the electoral list, valid votes, and votes for HDZ or 
HDZ-led coalition. HDZ vote-share was calculated by dividing the number of votes for HDZ 
(or the HDZ-led list) by the number of valid votes. Turnout was calculated by dividing the 
number of votes from the electoral list divided by the number of registered voters. The county-
level population estimates were obtained from the Croatian State Bureau of Statistics (DZS).4  
A primary aim of the analysis is how to measure the differing impact of the SARS-
CoV-2 outbreak across Croatian counties. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests are used to 
evaluate whether the virus is currently in the subject’s body. In counting the tests across 
countries, it is PCR testing that is tabulated. A form of PCR that uses reverse transcription (RT-
PCR) from RNA to DNA is employed in Croatia.  
The number of new cases of SARS-CoV-2 by county is published every day by the 
Croatian Institute for Public Health, and the time series is available to download in JSON 
 
1 Available from: https://www.izbori.hr/arhiva-izbora/data/parlament/2015/zip/rezultati.zip 
2 Available from: https://www.izbori.hr/arhiva-izbora/data/parlament/2016/zip/rezultati.zip 
3 Available from: https://www.izbori.hr/sabor2020/rezultati/1/excel/RezultatiPoBM.zip 
4 Available from: 
https://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/Pokazatelji/Stanovnistvo%20-%20pregled%20po%20gradovima%20i%20opcinam
a.xlsx 
format.5 The number of new tests conducted are reported daily,6 but the Croatian government 
web page does not compile the time series of tests conducted and it is not possible to see the 
change in the number of tests directly. Fortunately, testing data have been compiled since the 
end of March by Our World in Data (OWID). As mentioned by OWID, it is important to note 
that these numbers are reported as ‘tests performed’ until 5 May 2020, after which the phrase 
has changed to ‘people tested’. This may have some implications on comparing data over time,7 




5 Available from: https://www.koronavirus.hr/json/?action=po_danima_zupanijama 
6 Available (in English) from: https://koronavirus.hr/en 
7 See: https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-testing#croatia 
FIGURE 1: Daily new cases, raw and scaled by tests (seven-day rolling average) 
 
 
It is first important to examine the trajectory of the novel coronavirus epidemic in 
Croatia over the period under study using the OWID data set (black line-plot in Figure 1). 
Reported infections nationally tailed off in mid-May, but there was an increase in cases again 
in mid-June up to the election period. There is thus evidence of a ‘second wave’ of new 
infections in Croatia, but this could be an artefact of the number of tests. Thus, the reported 
cases can be scaled as follows: 
(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 ) ∗
(𝑛𝑜.𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒) 
(𝑛𝑜.𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)
  (1) 



























This is plotted in grey in Figure 1. Although not perfectly matching the daily number 
of infections, the overall shape of the trend is quite similar, and the two measures are highly 
correlated (r=0.97). The correspondence between the raw infections data and data scaled by 
the number of tests is reassuring so the raw numbers of infections by county are used in the 
remainder of the analysis. 
Using the official Croatian data, the intensity of the county-level SARS-CoV-2 
outbreak could simply be measured by taking the cumulative number of infections on election 
day. This, however, does not consider the substantial variation in population amongst counties. 
The measure used will hence be the total number of reported infections as of 5 July 2020 per 
100,000 inhabitants: 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
(𝑛𝑜.𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑓 5 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦 2020)
(𝑒𝑠𝑡.2018 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 100,000𝑠)
      (2) 
Following the approach of Healy and Malhotra (2010), the natural log of the measure 
of intensity is also considered. 
It is informative to think of the epidemic as a set of localised outbreaks, so the number 
of new daily infections are plotted by county in Figure 2.  




Second waves of infections are evident in some places, such as the City of Zagreb (Grad 
Zagreb) and Osječko-baranjska county, whilst others such as Splitsko-dalmatinska county only 
had a relatively pronounced early outbreak with very few cases since May. Thus, an alternative 
measure of the local epidemic is what percentage of the total number of infections occurred 
more recently. This measure is chosen instead of taking recent cases per 100,000 in the 
population, to distinguish between counties experiencing a second wave before the election 
instead of a first wave, and how this would affect aggregate voter behaviour.  Hence, in the 
current study, ‘recent’ is taken to mean the month before the election, so the measure is: 
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =  100 ∗
(𝑛𝑜.  𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 5 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒 2020 𝑡𝑜 5 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦 2020)
(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜.𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
   (3) 
Thus, the possible impact of SARS-CoV-2 is measured in two different ways, either as 
recency or intensity. The former is the county-level percentage of total infections in the month 
before the election (Equation 3). The latter is the total number of infections by county between 
1 April 2020 and 5 July 2020 (inclusive), per 100,000 inhabitants (Equation 2). 



































































































































The central challenge in the current study is how to estimate the average effect of SARS-CoV-
2 on parliamentary electoral results. We start by temporarily simplifying our problem to one 
where SARS-CoV-2 infections are either present or absent in a county (‘treatment’ or ‘control’ 
groups using experimental language). 
Since it is impossible to observe the same county in both infected and uninfected states, 
and to measure unit-level effects, it is necessary to estimate the effect as the mean difference 
between two counterfactual scenarios, or potential outcomes (Rubin, 1974). That is, we can 
estimate the average difference in outcomes between counties if they would have SARS-CoV-
2 infections and counties if they would not. 
The approach used in the analysis below is difference-in-differences (DD), which can 
be expressed as a regression model for panel data (i.e., repeated measures on the same unit) 
thus: 
yit = αi +λdt + δ(Si · dt) + εit      (4) 
 
where y is the outcome of interest for unit i at time t (either pre-treatment or post-
treatment). The coefficient α captures the unit fixed effects and λ time fixed effects. The former 
accounts for time-invariant unobserved factors within a unit that are related to the outcome. 
For example, there are particular counties where the average HDZ support is always higher or 
lower. The time fixed effects accounts for constant factors across units. For example, HDZ 
could have performed better or worse on average across counties for a particular election. The 
term Si is our ‘treatment’ (e.g., whether there are SARS-CoV-2 infections), and dt is a dummy 
variable that is 1 in the post-treatment period and 0 otherwise. Thus, the interaction term is 
only non-zero in the post-treatment period for treated units, and δ is the DD estimate. The error 
term is εit.  
Following the approach of Card (1992), Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 234-235) show 
how, instead of a dummy term, Si can also be continuous. Thus, instead of a binary variable for 
whether a county has SARS-CoV-2 infections, the ‘treatment’ in the current analysis is 
continuous and measured as intensity or recency as outlined in the previous section. In other 
words, the DD estimate δ is the expected change in y between 2016 and 2020 when infection 
rates change S2020-S2016. Note that S2016 (SARS-CoV-2 infection rates before the 2016 election) 
will always be 0, and the 2020 infection rate is non-zero, so the difference will simply be the 
absolute number of infections in 2020, S2020. 
The crucial assumption of the DD framework is that it can identify differences in the 
trends between treated and control groups. Although DD studies like are often before-after 
analysis for two periods, this has its shortcomings. For example, the aforementioned findings 
linking New Jersey shark attacks and the 1916 US Presidential election are confounded by the 
anomalous 1912 election, due to the presence of a credible candidate from a third party 
(Theodore Roosevelt), which split the vote and benefitted Wilson, thus overstating the 
President’s electoral decline in 1916 (Fowler & Hall, 2018). It is thus necessary to include at 
least two pre-treatment periods to establish parallel trends before investigating whether there 
is a divergence post-treatment. We thus use two elections, 2015 and 2016, before the SARS-
CoV-2 crisis. The form of Equation 4 can be extended to more than two periods, as seen below. 
There are a number of additional assumptions associated with DD, but we will focus 
on two that are most relevant to this study: anticipation and the stable unit treatment value 
assumption (SUTVA). The former means that voters could have anticipated the novel 
coronavirus outbreak in advance and this affected their behaviour in the previous election. 
However, the election was nearly four years before SARS-CoV-2 appeared, and well before 
the first cases were confirmed in Croatia in February 2020. SUTVA asserts that a unit’s 
potential outcome is not affected by the treatment level of other units. In other words, the 
effects of a treatment do not spill over into other subjects. This assumption is often a challenge 
in social scientific contexts (Keele, 2015, p. 317). In the present investigation, a major SARS-
CoV-2 outbreak in a neighbouring community might affect voting behaviour. The way to 
address spillovers in this type of analysis, given availability of disaggregated data, is the trade-
off between the number of cases (and thus statistical power) against a threat to SUTVA. For 
this study, the county level is the best that can be done to minimise problems with spillovers. 
Although there are statistical methods to analyse spatial error models for panel data (Millo & 
Piras, 2012), Gerber and Green (2012) illustrate the difficulties of modelling spatial spillovers 
properly. A simpler qualitative assumption is used here: counties are sufficiently large that 
voters will react only to their local county-level infection rates. Putting this together, the 
regression models estimated in the analysis will be of the form 
𝑦?̂? = ?̂? + ?̂?′idi +?̂?2020d2020 + ?̂?2015d2015 + ?̂?2020(Si· d2020) + ?̂?2015(Si· d2015)   (5) 
 
Where y is the outcome of interest (turnout or HDZ vote share), di are dummy terms 
for all but one of the counties (to capture county fixed effects), and d2015 and d2020 are year 
dummies. The year 2016 is used as the baseline in all of the models, so the two  coefficients 
are dummy terms that comprise the year fixed effects. The term Si is the ‘treatment’ – the 
county-level measure for the intensity or recency of SARS-CoV-2. Thus, the DD estimate is 
2020, and there is evidence of an effect if it is statistically significant. On the other hand, the 
estimate for 2015 tests the parallel trends assumption, that is, whether the expected difference 
in y between 2014 and 2015 is independent of the SARS-CoV-2 infection rate. This coefficient 
should be non-significant for the assumption to hold, because there should also be no SARS-
CoV-2 effect before the early 2020 outbreak. 




Turnout in the 10 territorial constituencies decreased over the course of the three parliamentary 
elections examined here, whilst support for HDZ was slightly lower in 2015 compared to 2016, 
and nearly identical during the latter two elections (2016 and 2020). The interpretation is 
similar when looking at the average county-level HDZ vote share and turnout (see Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1: turnout and HDZ vote share by election (%) 
 HDZ 2015 HDZ 2016 HDZ 2020 Turnout 2015 Turnout 2016 Turnout 2020 
Mean 36.48 37.72 39.46 60.51 52.89 44.98 
SD 11.20 10.90 9.82 2.72 2.63 2.65 
Total 33.68 36.08 36.87 61.53 53.41 45.57 
 
Turning to the county-level measures of SARS-CoV-2 infection, the average unlogged 
infection rate is 66.02 per 100,000 inhabitants (sd 37.59), and the logged infection rate mean 
is 3.99 (sd 0.71). On average, 26.72 per cent of the total cases were reported in the month 
leading up to the election (sd 21.13). It is also important to highlight that the median for the 
unlogged infection rate is 51.40, which suggests that the distribution is positively skewed and 
that there are a few outliers with higher values. Moreover, there is high variation in the 
percentage of recent cases and infection rate per 100,000 across the counties. The measure of 
infection recency is uncorrelated with both the unlogged (r=0.08) and logged (r=0.05) versions 
of the infections reported per 100,000 inhabitants. 
We fit six different models of the form in Equation 5, one for each measure of SARS-
CoV-2 infections and for the two outcomes of interest (see Table 2). 
 
TABLE 2: OLS Regression Results (n=63) 
outcome  HDZ vote share Turnout 
measure  recent unlogged logged recent unlogged logged 
        
infections x 2015 Coef. -0.029 -0.006 -0.324 0.019 -0.012 -0.681 
 SE 0.033 0.019 1.009 0.020 0.012 0.620 
 p-value 0.380 0.750 0.750 0.354 0.311 0.279 
        
infections x 2020 Coef. 0.038 -0.021 -1.240 -0.028 0.006 0.069 
 SE 0.033 0.019 1.009 0.020 0.012 0.620 
 p-value 0.246 0.288 0.227 0.169 0.635 0.912 
        
R2  0.974 0.972 0.972 0.978 0.976 0.975 
Adjusted R2  0.957 0.954 0.954 0.963 0.960 0.960 
 
The estimated coefficients infections x 2015 in Table 2 correspond to ?̂?2015 in Equation 
5. If these coefficients are non-significant, then we are able to proceed with the analysis, since 
it means that there is evidence of parallel trends regarding HDZ vote share or turnout before 
the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in Croatia. Reassuringly, none of the coefficients are statistically 
significant at any conventional level. 
Turning to the primary focus of the analysis, the coefficients infections x 2020 
correspond to ?̂?2020 in Equation 5. If there is evidence of an electoral effect, this coefficient 
would be statistically significant. However, whether we examine HDZ vote share or turnout, 
or whether we use unlogged or logged infection rates per 100,000 individuals, or percentage 
of overall reported infections in the month before the election, the coefficients are all 
statistically non-significant. In other words, accounting for the different average (time-
invariant) factors within counties and factors across counties within an election, there is 
insufficient evidence that reported SARS-CoV-2 infections affected county-level results. 
Moreover, the models were refitted without the estimates for  ?̂?2015 and ?̂?2020, that is, just the 
two-way fixed effects. 
None of the models fit better with the two additional coefficients (using F-tests, not 
shown). With county-level fixed effects, compared with 2016, the average HDZ vote share 
increased by 1.74 percentage points (p=0.002) and mean turnout decreased by 7.91 percentage 
points (p<0.001) within counties in 2020. Thus, although counties with higher infection rates 
or a greater percentage of overall infections just before the election did not affect electoral 




The results suggest a lack of a localised political effect in the wake of a pandemic. Perhaps 
there will be a deferred electoral response to SARS-CoV-2, and this can easily be incorporated 
into the framework in Equation 5 by adding future election years and the interaction term with 
the measure of SARS-CoV-2 infections. The results from the current analysis should be taken 
with caution, since there are only 21 Croatian counties, and so the statistical power of the 
analysis would only pick up larger effects. 
What the results in this study show is that although there are no average localised 
electoral effects in Croatia, there may have been global responses. That is, voters perhaps did 
not react to the impact of county-level infections, but rather that information about the outbreak 
(and the HDZ-led government’s effort to tackle it) may have had an average national rather 
than local / individual effect, though other factors could have also been at play. 
Another consideration is whether there are exogenous time-varying confounders. The 
county fixed effects account for time-invariant factors, but not for factors that have changed 
between 2015 and 2020 and may affect electoral behaviours. These confounders can easily be 
added to the DD framework outlined above (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). However, the 
confounders need to be exogenous, that is, unaffected by the treatment. If the confounders are 
endogenous, then the estimate of the DD effect can be biased. The problem with estimating the 
electoral effects of SARS-CoV-2 is that the most obvious time-varying confounders are prone 
to endogeneity. For example, electoral results and turnout can be affected by the overall 
approval rating for a government or support for a governing or opposition political party, which 
can be measured using regular public opinion data. Another confounding factor is the recent 
level of economic prosperity, which has a well-established link to electoral behaviour. 
However, SARS-CoV-2 infection rates and the government’s perceived handling of the crisis 
can affect approval ratings, which in turn condition electoral behaviour. Moreover, the SARS-
CoV-2 outbreak can be directly linked to unemployment, with illness, lockdown, and consumer 
anxiety all possible causes for an economic slowdown. 
The sternest test in conducting analyses linking SARS-CoV-2 to electoral behaviour is 
the reliability of the data on the ‘treatment’, that is, measures of infection rates. Using the raw 
counts, scaling by population, logged infections, or other transformations may lead to different 
conclusions in DD analyses (Goodman-Bacon & Marcus, 2020). The trajectory of new 
infections, hospitalisations, and deaths are all highly politically sensitive, and it may be in the 
interest of the relevant government to manipulate data such that its handling of the crisis 
appears effective. At worst, governments can withhold infections information in anticipation 
of an election or to protect approval ratings. For example, this appears to be the case in Serbia, 
where an investigation showed that numbers of deaths and those testing positive for SARS-
CoV-2 were suppressed between March and June 2020 (Jovanovic, 2020). 
Even without possible malfeasance, testing data need to be approached carefully. The 
reported new infections will sometimes be delayed depending on the day of the week (for 
example, data from the weekend), and the results are retrospectively amended. For this reason, 
it is advised to use a smoothed rolling average to detect trends in the data (as in Figure 1). 
Moreover, as explained above, increases in the number of cases can be due to increased testing 
or changes in the testing regime. 
Finally, SARS-CoV-2 testing data, like any diagnostic health testing, has a certain 
proportion of false positives and false negatives, which may lead to misleading aggregate data. 
The proportion of true positives (sensitivity) and true negatives (specificity) for RT-PCR are 
unknown for SARS-CoV-2, as is the incidence of infections, so the reliability of testing is 
estimated through clinical trials. In general, if there is low incidence of infection, then testing 
will be vulnerable to false positives, and if infection rates are high, then the rate of false 
negatives increases (Ismail, 2020).  
Despite these challenges, the framework uses two readily available forms of data in 
most democratic systems – electoral and detailed SARS-CoV-2 election data – and a relatively 
straightforward causal inference framework for the analysis. This allows for the approach to 
be used in other contexts, and will be more effective in places with more electoral units. As 
mentioned above, it is crucial to trade-off between statistical power and avoiding possible 
spillover effects. For example, in November 2020, it will be possible to use the DD approach 
to estimate the effect of SARS-CoV-2 in the US Presidential election using state-level data. 
Alternatively, it may be possible to apply DD in swing states to estimate the electoral effect of 
SARS-CoV-2 infection rates in swing states with a sufficient number of counties (e.g., Georgia 
or Michigan).  
Thus, it may be possible to investigate the impact of this unconventional global 
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